Question

...
Alex

Irrelevancy and the non-sequitur fallacy

I want to know how we can determine if something has a relevant implication.

Let’s take for example the wishful thinking fallacy. We know that simply wanting something to be true does not make it so. But…  how exactly do we know this?

How do we know that plausibility does not imply correctness?

Or how do we even know that correlation does not imply causation? How do we determine any of this?

asked on Wednesday, Jan 26, 2022 06:21:31 AM by Alex

Top Categories Suggested by Community

Comments

Want to get notified of all questions as they are asked? Update your mail preferences and turn on "Instant Notification."

Grow Intellectually by Taking Dr. Bo's Online Courses

Dr. Bo is creating online courses in the area of critical thinking, reason, science, psychology, philosophy, and well-being. These courses are self-paced and presented in small, easy-to-digest nuggets of information. Use the code FALLACYFRIENDS to get 25% off any or all of Dr. Bo's courses.

View All Dr. Bo's Courses

Answers

...
TrappedPrior (RotE)
2

We know that simply wanting something to be true does not make it so. But…  how exactly do we know this?

Test it out.

Wish for $1 million, in cash, to come raining through the roof of your house.

It won't happen, because wishing for something to be true (for money to fall from the sky into your hands) doesn't alter the reality (that money won't fall from the sky into your hands). There's no causal relationship between wishing for X and X happening, because 'wishes' by themselves have no causal power.

How do we know that plausibility does not imply correctness?

There are many possibilities, fewer probabilities, and a handful of certainties. Some of these possibilities are mutually exclusive. If plausibility (or possibility) implied correctness, then you'd have to grapple with blatantly contradictory outcomes.

For instance - I am thinking of one number between 0 and 10.

It is possible that this number is 2. It is also possible that it's 7. Yet I am only thinking of one number, so it can't be both 2 and 7. Not to mention the fact that there are numbers other than 2 and 7, between 0 and 10, that I could be thinking of.

Or how do we even know that correlation does not imply causation? How do we determine any of this?

Lots of things correlate, but there's no evidence that they are causing each other, nor is there a plausible mechanism for them to be causally related. 
 

answered on Wednesday, Jan 26, 2022 10:24:38 AM by TrappedPrior (RotE)

TrappedPrior (RotE) Suggested These Categories

Comments

...
Bo Bennett, PhD
0

You have a few different questions that have different answers.

We know that simply wanting something to be true does not make it so. But…  how exactly do we know this? 

Regarding fallacies, it doesn't matter. If the reason given is "because I want it to be true" it is fallacious. If I say that the earth is NOT flat because I really want it to be not flat... this is fallacious. It doesn't matter if the earth is flat or not.

How do we know that plausibility does not imply correctness? Or how do we even know that correlation does not imply causation? 

We don't need to know it doesn't; we just need evidence that it does . This is the idea of burden of proof . For example, if one claims that vaccines cause autism because shortly after giving their child the MMR vaccine(s) the child was diagnosed on the spectrum, in their mind they have established plausibility and objectively, correlation has been established. We cannot claim causation until it has been properly established (in science, establishing causation requires strict and specific methodology). We can never really say with certainty that there is no causation but we can say that there is no causation based on probability (e.g., we are extremely confident that vaccines don't cause autism based on exhaustive research combined with the fact that there is no plausible mechanism ).

In summary, it is fallacious to claim causation when it has not been properly established.

answered on Wednesday, Jan 26, 2022 06:41:17 AM by Bo Bennett, PhD

Bo Bennett, PhD Suggested These Categories

Comments

...
0
Alex writes:

Regarding fallacies, it doesn't matter. If the reason given is "because I want it to be true" it is fallacious. If I say that the earth is NOT flat because I really want it to be not flat... this is fallacious. It doesn't matter if the earth is flat or not.

 But Dr. Bo you didn’t really answer me here. I know it’s fallacious but I just want to know how. Like did we do a thought experiment to conclude that it’s fallacious? Just how? I understand the second part of your answer though.

posted on Wednesday, Jan 26, 2022 07:23:14 AM
...
0
Bo Bennett, PhD writes:
[To Alex]

Let me try again. You asked

We know that simply wanting something to be true does not make it so. But…  how exactly do we know this?  

No, we don't know that wanting something to be true doesn't make it so. It depends what the want is. For example, wanting something to be true makes it true that I want that something to be true. Now let's assume there is a mystical force proposed that turns desire into facts. So if I want my stocks to go up on a given day, the stock gods will make it so. I have the want, and sure enough, the stocks go up. Can we rule out the stock gods (i.e., that wanting caused the stocks to go up)? No. But we can't say that this is a reasonable conclusion because there is no evidence that the wanting caused the stocks to go up. This is post hoc reasoning. So although we don't "know" that wanting doesn't make something true, we cannot say it is true unless we have demonstrated it to be so.

[ login to reply ] posted on Wednesday, Jan 26, 2022 08:00:20 AM
...
0
Alex writes:
[To Bo Bennett, PhD]

Well what I mean by “want” here is merely the desire for a proposition to be true or false. For instance, I could say that there are invisible dragons cursing me all the time and that this is indeed factual because I want it to be so.

[ login to reply ] posted on Wednesday, Jan 26, 2022 08:11:37 AM
...
0
Bo Bennett, PhD writes:
[To Alex]

I could say that there are invisible dragons cursing me all the time and that this is indeed factual  because I want it to be so. 

Then you are simply not using the word "factual" correctly.

[ login to reply ] posted on Wednesday, Jan 26, 2022 08:54:38 AM
...
0
Alex writes:
[To Bo Bennett, PhD]

What you said, however, makes me ask another question. If we can’t say that the stock gods are fictional because we don’t know if they are real or not, then does that mean we can never say that anything is fictional? What about magic, dancing unicorns, the Great Pink Hulk, or the Flying Spaghetti Monster? Shouldn’t we say that these things are fictional and not real? Really?

[ login to reply ] posted on Wednesday, Jan 26, 2022 08:16:12 AM
...
0
Bo Bennett, PhD writes:
[To Alex]

If we can’t say that the stock gods are fictional because we don’t know if they are real or not, 

That is not what I wrote. We can't say we know for sure that stock gods did not turn our want into fact because we are being epistemologically honest and precise in our language. We can say they we believe they are fictional because we haven't been presented with convincing evidence that they exist (and turn wants into facts). In everyday language, we can say they fictional - especially if we know they were a product of fiction (like we know the origin of the story was from a fictional book).

[ login to reply ] posted on Wednesday, Jan 26, 2022 08:58:18 AM
...
0
Alex writes:
[To Bo Bennett, PhD]

So we believe  they’re fictional?

[ login to reply ] posted on Wednesday, Jan 26, 2022 08:59:41 AM
...
0
Bo Bennett, PhD writes:
[To Alex]

I do. And I hope you do as well :) Again, if there is ample evidence that they are fictional (like the example of knowing the fictional book they came from), we can say we know they are fictional. This is an everyday use of the concept of knowing and fine.

[ login to reply ] posted on Wednesday, Jan 26, 2022 09:04:05 AM