Is foreknowledge logically impossible?

I agree with your argument, we cannot know the future. If we successfully predict something it is more a matter of luck and often selective memory bias.  A memory bias is a cognitive bias that either impairs or enhances the recall of a memory by altering the content of what we remember. We may actually go back in our minds and say we predicted something that happened, but is our memory of what we predicted accurate? 

Thank you, Bo.

I think your clause "the past, present, and future all exist simultaneously" is itself a logical contradiction, unless you admit that (eg) it's logically possible for you to be born BOTH in 1970 (in the past) AND born in 2066 (the future). 

In other words, your were BOTH [born in 1970] and NOT [born in 1970], violating the Law of Non-Contradiction.

I am not going to pretend I know more than I do here, but I will say that this is not an original idea and one supported by many in respective fields. See https://www.youtube.com/results?search_query=past+present+future+exist+at+same+time .

No, 1970 is 1970. It doesn't become 2066.

"No, 1970 is 1970. It doesn't become 2066."

I agree. However, 1970 is in the past, and 2066 is in the future.

Based on the view that the past, present, and future all exist simultaneously and we are just living in the present, then 1970 would exist simultaneously with 2066, which is of course nonsensical.

The theory of relativity has shown that time can be vastly different for different observers, from different frames of reference, but it never once showed that that applied to a single observer.

All of those YouTube links show how time is very different for different observers, but never for a single observer.

You have missed the point completely.

A scenario, or claim, is either logically impossible, or it isn't.

A good logician will deconstruct any proposition or claim, and show a conclusion.

Perhaps you're confusing this OP with the nonsensical and mongitudinous proposition of time travel.

Hi Kaiden,

I mean "value" as in true/false, 0/1, yes/no, or even something more complex. I used the word to try to simplify the nature of the future outcome.

Let's just take a simple example : a lottery draw happens next week, and you have bought a ticket. You will either win or lose, so the outcome's value is win/lose. Foreknowledge is not possible, but a successful prediction is (eg you will probably lose).

In more detail, the outcome value could be either the winning number of {1, 5, 33, 39, 41, 46} or NOT {1, 5, 33, 39, 41, 46} (every other losing number). Foreknowledge here is not possible, and a successful prediction is extremely unlikely.

I hope that answers your question!

 

[To Jim]

I mean "value" as in true/false, 0/1, yes/no, or even something more complex. 

I am afraid that this does not explicitly define “value” and in fact finishes by leaving the notion open ended. Moreover, your posts are problematic now in two ways in that you have contradicted yourself twice. 

If, doing my best to extrapolate correctly from your examples, a value is just a binary of mutually exclusive options, then here is the first way in which your posts are implicitly contradictory. Return to the case of buying a lottery ticket. You asserted that when the lottery is drawn next week, I will either win or lose with my ticket. Consider the following binary, then. When the lottery draw is announced next week, I will either either win or lose or neither win nor lose . The outcomes of the future have the values:

E: either win or lose

N: neither win nor lose. 

As far as I can tell, E/N constitutes as fair a binary as the rest that you present. If I understood you correctly, you claim to know that E will be the case. After all, you said to me—a lottery ticket holder awaiting next weeks announcement—that I “will either win or lose.” You also claim that foreknowledge is impossible. However, claiming both is a contradiction. 

Here is another way in which you seem to have contradicted yourself. Return to the case of me purchasing a lottery ticket. You said on March 11th that “the outcomes value is win/lose.” However, on February 2nd, in your OP, you said that since the future does not exist, the outcome's value “does not yet exist.” The outcome of my lottery ticket purchase cannot both have no existing value and have the value win/lose. If the outcome does not yet have a value, then it could not also be the case that the outcome’s value is win/lose. 

Hi Kaiden,

I'm not sure I understand what you are saying, but you have alerted to me the fact that the outcome of something in the future may be more than a binary outcome.

If the lottery takes place, then since you have bought a ticket, you either win or lose - that's a binary outcome. However, if the lottery does not take place (eg the machine breaks down), then in that case you {neither} win or lose (although the outcome would be the same as losing).

So now I'm thinking of [nested] probabilities and outcomes.

(1) If you had posted the theme of the OP, how would you have presented it?
(2) Is your conclusion that foreknowledge IS logically impossible, or it IS logically possible?

[To Jim]

I'm not sure I understand what you are saying, 

What I’ve argued is that your comments are contradictory in two places. Firstly, you claim both that you know that I will either win or lose and that foreknowledge is logically impossible. Claiming both is a contradiction. Secondly, you asserted that the outcome’s value is win/lose and asserted later that the outcome does not yet have an existing value. Asserting both is a contradiction. 

You can hardly deny consistently that foreknowledge is logically possible, because of other claims you asserted. You asserted that if the lottery machine is broken, then I will neither win nor lose. Well, suppose the lottery machine breaks. Notice that knowledge of the future would then be just a Modus Ponens away. The resulting argument would be this:

1. If the lottery machine is broken, I will neither win nor lose
2. The lottery machine is broken 
3. Therefore, I will neither win nor lose

If it is possible to know 1 and 2, and possible for a us to make a Modus Ponens inference from 1 and 2 to 3, then it is possible to know that I will neither win nor lose the lottery and, ipso facto, possible to know the future. Therefore, in order to deny that it is logically possible to know the future you must deny that knowing 1 is a logical possibility, or deny that knowing 2 is, or deny that a Modus Ponens inference from 1 and 2 to 3 is. Which of these three will you deny?

Your argument in the OP is not a good argument, for reasons alluded to by Dr. Bennett. One of the claims supporting your conclusion is that there is not yet any future outcome. According to the B-theory of time, past and future events are as real as present events. The event of me losing the lottery next week (perhaps, winning) is real, even as I type this sentence. Your argument begs the question against a B-theorist’s claim that foreknowledge is logically possible. If I wrote on the OP’s theme, I would argue that the B-theory of time is false to avoid begging the question on the nature of time.

[To Kaiden]

"Firstly, you claim both that you know that I will either win or lose and that foreknowledge is logically impossible. Claiming both is a contradiction."

Actually, this is you using the tactic of what is known as "blustercunting" - in other words, you are misrepresenting the meaning of what I said. In a way you are right, because you are making an over-literal case here, meaning you knew what I meant, but you have taken the clauses literally, in order to  invoke a contradiction.

After you pointed out the alleged contradiction, I conceded that that there were more than just two outcomes, ie not just [win] or [lose], but [null], in the case of the lottery not taking place, for any reason.

So, knowing the future, or future outcome, is logically impossible.

"According to the B-theory of time, past and future events are as real as present events. The event of me losing the lottery next week (perhaps, winning) is real, even as I type this sentence."

The B-theory of time is quite silly, really, and in reality it is no more than a thought experiment. Of course the past, present and future are equally real - that's pretty much stating the obvious. The claim that time is an illusion is also rather silly, as it's blatantly obvious that we CAN only ever experience the present.

Perhaps you could make a statement now, as to whether you believe that foreknowledge of future events is either logically possible, or logically impossible.

[To Jim]

Actually, this is you using the tactic of what is known as "blustercunting" - in other words, you are misrepresenting the meaning of what I said. In a way you are right, because you are making an over-literal case here, meaning you knew what I meant, but you have taken the clauses literally, in order to  invoke a contradiction.

Claiming to know what will happen (that I will neither win nor lose) and claiming that foreknowledge is impossible is a contradiction. Your reply on Sunday contains no correction of my interpretation of the sentence “I will either win or lose.” You do not say anything resembling “Kaiden, you thought that ‘I will either win or lose’ meant x, but it means y, and x and y really are distinct meanings…” So, if I misrepresented the meaning of that sentence, you have not shown how.

I conceded that that there were more than just two outcomes, ie not just [win] or [lose], but [null], in the case of the lottery not taking place, for any reason. So, knowing the future, or future outcome, is logically impossible.

This concession does not address the essence of my objection. If you concede knowledge that I will neither win nor lose (in the case of the lottery not taking place), and claim that you cannot know the future, that is a contradiction. The statements I know you will neither win nor lose and I cannot know the future cannot possibly both be true. Moreover, your argument against the possibility of foreknowledge begs the question, as I explained. So, your belief in the logical impossibility of knowing the future is unjustified independently of concerns about whether I understood the sentence "I know you will neither win nor lose" correctly. 

The B-theory of time is quite silly, really…Of course the past, present and future are equally real - that's pretty much stating the obvious.

The silliness of the B-theory of time does not dissolve the fallacy of begging the question in your argument. Whether your argument begs the question has nothing to do with how silly the view that it begs the question against is. Besides, your remark is confusing. According to the B-theory of time, the past, present and future are equally real. You call the B-theory silly… but agree with the thesis. That is confusing. Moreover, you agree that the future is real, but you deny in the OP that the future is created yet or exists. A reality that does not exist and nor is yet created? That is confusing and perhaps you can clarify how your various comments amount to a coherent view of time.

Perhaps you could make a statement now, as to whether you believe that foreknowledge of future events is either logically possible, or logically impossible.

Foreknowledge is logically possible. Consider the following argument that I elaborated on earlier.

1. If the lottery machine is broken, I will neither win nor lose

2. The lottery machine is broken

3. Therefore, I will neither win nor lose

Knowing that 1 is true is logically possible. Knowing that 2 is true is logically possible. Applying modus ponens to 1 and 2 to infer 3 is logically possible, which would generate knowledge of 3. So, it is logically possible to know the future. As I said, you can hardly deny that foreknowledge is logically possible. For you agreed that 1 is knowable. And surely you agree that you can make a modus ponens inference from 1 and 2 to 3. Therefore, in order to deny that foreknowledge is logically impossible, your last stand must be to maintain that knowing that the lottery machine is broken is a logical impossibility.

Isn't this fun? :)

"According to the B-theory of time, the past, present and future are equally real. You call the B-theory silly… but agree with the thesis."

Of course the past, present and future are equally real, but they form a strict sequence, which is irreversible.  The B-theory claims that time is tenseless (which is true, because we only ever experience "now"), but you cannot escape the fact the the flow of time is real, since at least a few seconds have elapsed between you reading the first and last words of this paragraph.

"Foreknowledge is logically possible. Consider the following argument that I elaborated on earlier.

1. If the lottery machine is broken, I will neither win nor lose

2. The lottery machine is broken

3. Therefore, I will neither win nor lose"

You have a problem with the above. (1) is a conditional statement, but (2) cannot be established NOW (the broken machine is a future event, thus not knowable now), therefore (3) is a non-sequitur.

Of course, if you were speaking after the event, the argument would be just fine. Do note that in (3), as well as adhering to the flow of sound logic, reality dictates that event outcome value of "not winning" is exactly equal to "losing".

[To Jim]

You have a problem with the above. (1) is a conditional statement, but (2) cannot be established NOW (the broken machine is a future event, thus not knowable now), therefore (3) is a non-sequitur.

The lottery machine is broken is not an event, let alone a future event. The lottery machine is broken is a state. This is why your critique is a nonstarter. The idea that P2 is about the future, anyways, is fabricated by you. Nothing I wrote in the argument suggests anything other than that P2 aims to capture what is present. And you have not shown that I know that the lottery machine is broken  is a logical impossibility.

Besides, I turn the table on you in pointing out that your conclusion  3 is a non-sequitur is a non-sequitur. Just because 2 cannot be established now, doesn’t mean that 3 does not follow from 1 and 2. Validity is not about establishing the premises, but about the logical relationship between premises and conclusion. 

Finally, 3 is not a non-sequitur. Surprisingly, you did respond that a Modus Ponens inference cannot be made from 1 and 2 to 3! However, 3 is connected to 1 and 2 by a Modus Ponens inference, which is a valid inference. The argument has the form if A then B,  A, therefore, B. 

On account of these three responses, you have not provided good reasons to doubt the goodness of my argument for the logical possibility of foreknowledge, while your argument against the logical possibility is question begging, as I argued. This is the main takeaway. Though, let me say something about how you responded to my confusion over your claim that B-theory is silly. 

Of course the past, present and future are equally real, but they form a strict sequence, which is irreversible. The B-theory claims that time is tenseless (which is true, because we only ever experience "now"), but...”

The B-theory of time may refer to a block conception of time, which I specified to be my usage of the name “B-theory of time”, but perhaps not clearly enough. The deeper issue is that you reaffirm your belief in the reality of  future events, but still have not resolved precisely the confusion that I raised earlier in regards to that belief. How is it coherent of you to believe both that future events are real (not the reality of the flow of time, but the reality of future events) and that future events are not yet created and do not exist?

"The lottery machine is broken is not an event, let alone a future event. The lottery machine is broken is a state."

But it is a future state, and your reference to it is present/past.

You would need to re-form your argument thus : 

1. At the time of the lottery draw (eg next Tue 7pm), if the lottery machine is broken, I will neither win nor lose

2. The lottery machine is broken

3. Therefore, I will neither win nor lose"

"How is it coherent of you to believe both that future events are real (not the reality of the flow of time, but the reality of future events) and that future events are not yet created and do not exist?"

I think we all know that the future is real. The very definition of the future implies events/outcomes/event outcome values which do not yet exist, but will at some time. The only possible way for the future not to exist, would be if time were removed. Eg if entirety were obliterated, and there was nothing to measure time by, then time would cease to exist (as would any future). 

"On account of these three responses, you have not provided good reasons to doubt the goodness of my argument for the logical possibility of foreknowledge, while your argument against the logical possibility is question begging, as I argued."

You cannot demonstrate the logical possibility of foreknowledge using "if--then" statements. Furthermore (replying to your other comment) : 


"Claiming to know that I will either win or lose or neither win nor lose and that  foreknowledge is impossible  is also contradictory."


This is problematic, as [either win or lose] or [neither win nor lose] covers every possible outcome (including being completely obliterated by a cosmic collision). So, it negates the concept of foreknowledge. If the only future outcomes are [A] and [not A], then stating that as foreknowledge is perfectly logical and there is no contradiction involved.

It's a bit like saying "you know tomorrow will come, it or won't." That's an almost tautological statement, and near-meaningless, especially in the realm of foreknowledge.

All of this argument is branching out in many different directions, so here is the original set of statements I made :

(1) "Since the future event has not yet taken place, the outcome is as yet uncreated, and neither has its value, therefore it is not logically possible to know the outcome's value when it does not yet exist.

(2) "The outcome's value cannot both [exist] AND [NOT exist], because that would violate the Law of Non-Contradiction.
.
(3) "Put another way, one would need to be BOTH at [ t=0 ] and NOT [ t=0 ], which would violate the Law of Non-Contradiction."

[To Jim]

But it is a future state, and your reference to it is present/past.

When you claimed earlier that P2 is about a future state, I replied that P2 aims to capture the present and that nothing I wrote states otherwise. Merely saying back that P2 is about a future state accomplishes exactly nothing.

I think we all know that the future is real. The very definition of the future implies events/outcomes/event outcome values which do not yet exist, but will at some time. 

Unfortunately, this just restates the belief that I said was confusing, without answering the question that I have asked a few times now. How is it coherent of you to believe both that future events are real and that future events are not yet created and do not exist?

You cannot demonstrate the logical possibility of foreknowledge using "if--then" statements. Furthermore (replying to your other comment) :  

Let me reiterate what my argument actually is. I gave the argument that since knowing 1 and 2 is a logical possibility, and making a Modus Ponens inference to 3 is a logical possibility, knowledge of the future is a logical possibility. (These numbers correspond to the premises of the argument I presented earlier this morning.) If you deny the logically possibility of foreknowledge, your options are to deny that it is logically possible to know 1, or to know 2, or to infer 3 from 1 and 2. You have not shown that my argument is bad. 

Regarding option one, you agreed that it is logically possible to know 1. Regarding option two, your argument that 2 is not knowable now because it is about a future event is a bad argument because 2 is not about the future, as I explained and to which you merely say in your previous post that I’m wrong. Regarding option three, your argument that 3 does not follow from 1 and 2 committed the fallacy of non sequitur, as I explained in my previous post. 

So, that was the argument I actually gave, along with why it survives your objections. Meanwhile, your argument against the logical possibility of foreknowledge begs the question, as I argued. Again, this is my takeaway. You can post your three claims at the bottom of your comment in red, but I have already pointed out that your argument against foreknowledge formulated out of those claims begs the question and so constitutes a bad argument.

This is problematic, as [either win or lose] or [neither win nor lose] covers every possible outcome (including being completely obliterated by a cosmic collision). So, it negates the concept of foreknowledge. If the only future outcomes are [A] and [not A], then stating that as foreknowledge is perfectly logical and there is no contradiction involved. 

It negates the concept of foreknowledge? However, you stated only sentences later that “stating it as foreknowledge is perfect logical”. It is confusing how it both negates the concept of foreknowledge and may be perfectly logically stated as foreknowledge. Stating it as foreknowledge is perfectly logical and there is no contradiction involved? However, you stated all throughout this thread that foreknowledge is logically impossible. Again, confusion ensues regarding your comments. Perhaps, you can clarify these seemingly conflicting remarks. 

[To Jim]

Elaborating on your question of how I would have presented the theme of the OP, maybe what you want to argue is that foreknowledge of contingent future events and states is logically impossible. Foreknowledge of them is logically impossible because, as you might want to argue, our beliefs about future contingent events have no truth-makers. A truth-maker is that which makes it the case that a true statement is true. The fact Joe Biden is president of the USA, for instance, makes it true that Joe Biden is president of the USA . Future contingent states and events do not exist. Therefore, statements about future contingent states and events cannot be true because their truth-makers (which would be the future events and states themselves) do not exist in order to stand as truth-makers to the statements. If a statement about the future were true, then its truth-maker would have to exist now (in order forbidding the statement to be true now), which means that the statement about the future would be about the present, which is a contradiction. 

That is a rough approximation of the argument you may want to give. The reason I suggest this sketch is because it solves the issue you kept facing in which you were denying foreknowledge while affirming that you knew that I will either win or lose or neither win nor lose the lottery. 

"The reason I suggest this sketch is because it solves the issue you kept facing in which you were denying foreknowledge while affirming that you knew that I will either win or lose or neither win nor lose the lottery."

Again, those two outcomes constitute the entire set, so one of them must turn out to be true. It's because of this that your claim of a contradiction proves false.

Look at this truth statement : everything is either [A] or [not A]. It matters not whether it is past, present or future - it's true in all cases.

Look at it a simpler way - you can have foreknowledge that [you win the lottery] OR [you don't win the lottery]. ONE of these simply MUST be true. You can win the lottery if you had chosen the correct numbers, or you could NOT win the lottery (for any reason, including you and entirety being obliterated by a catastrophic cosmic event).

I'm going to put this format out as a separate question, and see if we can get any feedback on it.

[To Jim]

…It's because of this that your claim of a contradiction proves false. 

This objection fails because of misguided methodology. That is not how a contradiction is proven absent. Showing that two statements are not contradictory means, colloquially, showing that there is a logically possible circumstance in which the conjunction of the two statements is true.

you can have foreknowledge that [you win the lottery] OR [you don't win the lottery]. 

If I’m reading this correctly, and since I see no more arguments against the logical possibility of foreknowledge, I’m glad to see that we finally agree that foreknowledge is logically possible. Thank you, in closing, for being a thoughtful and mild-tempered interlocutor, Jim. Unless you have more to comment?

"If I’m reading this correctly, and since I see no more arguments against the logical possibility of foreknowledge, I’m glad to see that we finally agree that foreknowledge is logically possible."

Well, I disagree, but we seem to have come full circle here, and simply cannot come to an agreement. I think the problem here lies with communication and understanding of what is involved in this highly complex scenario.

"Thank you, in closing, for being a thoughtful and mild-tempered interlocutor, Jim."

You too!

[To Jim]

Claiming to know that I will either win or lose or neither win nor lose and that  foreknowledge is impossible  is also contradictory. Essentially, you are contradicting yourself in any instance in which you claim to know what will be the case.

Hi Kaiden!

I know it's been a while, and I think I did mean to reply to your last comment, but other things got in the way. The topic has come up again on another forum.

Anyway, as to your final comment, all I can say is that "foreknowledge is logically impossible" would need to be revised to exclude the obvious replies, such as "foreknowledge is possible. In two days time, 2+2 will equal 4".

So in a way your comment is of that type : stating the obvious, a fact that is unconditionally and always true. So, in the "foreknowledge" case, saying that [I will either win or lose] or [neither win nor lose] is stating the obvious, and actually have the same result as not making a statement at all.

Do you agree?